> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://continuum-three-olive.vercel.app/docs/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Share Links > Publish a transcript as a read-only link on continuumcode.ai — a fixed snapshot, redacted on the server, revocable at any time. Any session's transcript can be published as a read-only web page at `continuumcode.ai/share/`. It is how you show someone what an agent actually did — the prompts, the replies, which files changed — without a screenshot, a repo invite, or an account on their side. A share is a **snapshot**, not a window into your machine. Publishing copies the transcript to Continuum's server; the link never reaches back to your host, and it does not follow the session as it keeps working. ## Sharing a transcript **Share transcript…** appears in the session's context menu in the sidebar, in the workspace tab menu, and in the transcript's own overflow menu. **Share transcript…** is in the session's overflow menu on the Code screen, and in the transcript header. Once the link exists, the standard iOS share sheet is one tap away. The transcript header carries a share button that opens the same sheet with the same preview and the same options. Apple Watch cannot share — it never decodes a transcript in the first place, so there is nothing on the watch to publish. The sheet shows a **dry run**: exactly the items the server would store, already redacted, with `[redacted:…]` markers where something was masked. One line summarizes what was removed and why — for example *"12 items removed (secrets, paths)."* Nothing has been published yet. **7 days**, **30 days**, or **Never**. **Create link** publishes the snapshot and hands you the URL. From there you can **Copy link**, **Open** it, change the expiry and **Update share**, or **Revoke** it on the spot. Sharing requires being signed in to a Continuum account — the link is minted against your account, so it shows up in your Shared Links list and is attributed to you rather than to the machine. ## What the server strips **Redaction happens on the server, and only on the server.** No client redacts anything, which means no client — including a modified or out-of-date one — can widen what a link exposes. It works as an **allowlist**: each message is rebuilt from a known set of fields, and anything unrecognized is dropped. A field added to transcripts tomorrow cannot leak into a public link by default; it is simply absent from shares until someone deliberately adds it. On top of that, free text is scrubbed: | Category | Treatment | | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | API keys and tokens | Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub (tokens and PATs), Slack, AWS, Google, Continuum bearers, JWTs, and PEM private keys → `[redacted:…]` | | `key: value` secrets | Anything named like `api_key`, `token`, `password`, `secret`, `authorization` keeps its name and loses its value. Dotenv-style lines in captured output are masked the same way. | | Database URLs | Connection strings with embedded credentials are masked. | | Home and temp paths | `/Users/you`, `/home/you`, `C:\Users\you` → `~`; per-boot temp directories → `$TMPDIR`. No OS username survives a share — this is asserted over the whole serialized payload as a test. | | Email addresses, private IPs | Replaced. Public IPs are left alone: redacting them would be noise, not privacy. | | URLs | Query strings and fragments are cut off, because that is where tokens ride. | | Very long output | Truncated with a `[truncated N characters]` marker. | Raw tool input is **never stored at all** — not stored and redacted, just not stored. Full file contents passed to a write, whole shell command lines, credentials passed as flags: none of it is part of a share, because the shared page doesn't render it anyway. It was the single largest leak surface and dropping it cost nothing visible. ## Who can see it Share links are **unlisted, not private**. The id is 22 random characters — roughly 131 bits — so guessing one is infeasible, but anyone holding the link can read the transcript. Treat it like a document link, not a password-protected page. Continuum deliberately does **not** block `/share/` in `robots.txt`. Doing so would stop link previews from rendering on X and elsewhere, and the unguessable id is what actually keeps a share unlisted. Each page is server-rendered so it carries its own preview title and description when pasted into a chat app. The transcript itself is embedded in the page, so once it loads it makes no further network requests. Viewers see the session title, which agent ran it, when the snapshot was taken, and the redacted transcript — prompts, replies, tool calls and their results, and the per-file edit counts. They do not need a Continuum account, and they get no access to your session, your host, or your repository. ## Managing and revoking links **Settings → Shared Links** on Mac, iPhone, and the web lists every transcript link your account has published, with the option to copy or **revoke** each one. Revoking takes effect immediately: the page becomes "This link was turned off." An expired link says so too, rather than 404ing as if it never existed. Because a share is a fixed copy, editing or continuing the session does **not** change what a published link shows. If you want the newer transcript to be visible, open the sheet again and update the share — which re-snapshots it in place, keeping the same URL. Re-snapshotting is rate-limited, so a link can't be used as a live feed. Revoking a link stops future views. It cannot un-see anything already read or unfurled. If a share exposed something it shouldn't have, revoke it *and* rotate whatever was exposed. ## Related * [Sessions](/docs/features/sessions) — the transcripts these links are cut from. * [Privacy](/docs/privacy) — everything else that does and doesn't leave your machine. * [Security](/docs/security) — the account and host trust model behind minting a link.