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Any session’s transcript can be published as a read-only web page at continuumcode.ai/share/<id>. It is how you show someone what an agent actually did — the prompts, the replies, which files changed — without a screenshot, a repo invite, or an account on their side. A share is a snapshot, not a window into your machine. Publishing copies the transcript to Continuum’s server; the link never reaches back to your host, and it does not follow the session as it keeps working.

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Sharing a transcript

Share transcript… appears in the session’s context menu in the sidebar, in the workspace tab menu, and in the transcript’s own overflow menu.
Apple Watch cannot share — it never decodes a transcript in the first place, so there is nothing on the watch to publish.
1

Review the preview

The sheet shows a dry run: exactly the items the server would store, already redacted, with [redacted:…] markers where something was masked. One line summarizes what was removed and why — for example “12 items removed (secrets, paths).” Nothing has been published yet.
2

Choose an expiry

7 days, 30 days, or Never.
3

Create the link

Create link publishes the snapshot and hands you the URL. From there you can Copy link, Open it, change the expiry and Update share, or Revoke it on the spot.
Sharing requires being signed in to a Continuum account — the link is minted against your account, so it shows up in your Shared Links list and is attributed to you rather than to the machine.

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What the server strips

Redaction happens on the server, and only on the server. No client redacts anything, which means no client — including a modified or out-of-date one — can widen what a link exposes. It works as an allowlist: each message is rebuilt from a known set of fields, and anything unrecognized is dropped. A field added to transcripts tomorrow cannot leak into a public link by default; it is simply absent from shares until someone deliberately adds it. On top of that, free text is scrubbed:
Raw tool input is never stored at all — not stored and redacted, just not stored. Full file contents passed to a write, whole shell command lines, credentials passed as flags: none of it is part of a share, because the shared page doesn’t render it anyway. It was the single largest leak surface and dropping it cost nothing visible.

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Who can see it

Share links are unlisted, not private. The id is 22 random characters — roughly 131 bits — so guessing one is infeasible, but anyone holding the link can read the transcript. Treat it like a document link, not a password-protected page. Continuum deliberately does not block /share/ in robots.txt. Doing so would stop link previews from rendering on X and elsewhere, and the unguessable id is what actually keeps a share unlisted. Each page is server-rendered so it carries its own preview title and description when pasted into a chat app. The transcript itself is embedded in the page, so once it loads it makes no further network requests. Viewers see the session title, which agent ran it, when the snapshot was taken, and the redacted transcript — prompts, replies, tool calls and their results, and the per-file edit counts. They do not need a Continuum account, and they get no access to your session, your host, or your repository. Settings → Shared Links on Mac, iPhone, and the web lists every transcript link your account has published, with the option to copy or revoke each one. Revoking takes effect immediately: the page becomes “This link was turned off.” An expired link says so too, rather than 404ing as if it never existed. Because a share is a fixed copy, editing or continuing the session does not change what a published link shows. If you want the newer transcript to be visible, open the sheet again and update the share — which re-snapshots it in place, keeping the same URL. Re-snapshotting is rate-limited, so a link can’t be used as a live feed.
Revoking a link stops future views. It cannot un-see anything already read or unfurled. If a share exposed something it shouldn’t have, revoke it and rotate whatever was exposed.
  • Sessions — the transcripts these links are cut from.
  • Privacy — everything else that does and doesn’t leave your machine.
  • Security — the account and host trust model behind minting a link.